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I. INTRODUCTION

Since the 1970's, federal legislation has expanded privacy rights in
nonconstitutional areas. 2 Juxtaposed against this more liberal legislative trend
is the action of a significantly more conservative judiciary which has, and is,

1
Professor of Criminal Justice, West Chester University; J.D., Widener University
School of Law, 1978; B.A. Pennsylvania State University, 1971.
2
The primary federal laws governing privacy are: Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1681 (1988) (protecting consumers from unauthorized disclosure of credit
information); Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988) (barring certain sharing of
information among governmental agencies); Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 3401-22 (1988) (regulating governmental access to customer bank records); Video
Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710) (1988) (generally prohibiting
disclosures of records of video rentals); Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act
of 1988,5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988) (regulating cross-matching of federally held information
under certain circumstances).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1993

1

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:59

contracting that right in those areas governed by the Constitution. 3 An
examination of the Supreme Court's most recent decisions in the criminal law
arena readily bears witness to this proclivity.
The High Court's conservative shift certainly isn't unanimous. Justices

Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens have complained vociferously of
this new direction.4 They see the products of the judicial activism of the 1960's

unravelling in the wake of the conservative activism of the Reagan and Bush

appointees. 5 Their vigorous dissents urge an "evolutionary" view of the
Constitution-a living, breathing document designed to mature over time. The

3

A prime example of this is the Court's evolution of the renowned abortion case,
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe was originally interpreted as bestowing an
unfettered right to abortion (in the first trimester) under the Constitution. The Court has
in the past several years, however, permitted several fetters. These restraints include
the upholding of state statutes which: require a twenty-four hour waiting period and
parental consent, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791 (1992); require parental notification, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990);
prohibit the use of public funds, employees or facilities to perform the procedure or to
provide abortion counseling, Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
Additional cases cited in this text will address the diminution of the constitutional right
to privacy with regard to various law enforcement practices.
4

See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). Justice
Blackmun penned a biting dissent in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined. In
this dissent, Justice Blackmun expressed "fear for the integrity of, and public esteem for
[the] Court." Id. at 538. "This 'it-is-so-because-we-say-so' jurisprudence constitutes
nothing other than an attempted exercise of brute force; reason, much less persuasion,
has no place." Id. at 552. He concludes, "[a] chill wind blows". Id. at 560.
In National Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), Justice Marshall,
joined by Justice Brennan, called the majority's analysis "unprincipled and
unjustifiable". Id. at 680. In Florida v. Bostick, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (1991), Justice Marshall
(joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens) accused the Court of"trivializing" the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 2394. In California v. Hodari, 111 S.Ct. 1547 (1991), Justice Stevens
(joined by Justice Marshall) accused the majority of "creative lawmaking". Id. at 1559.
In another case, Justice Brennan (joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens), invoked
"George Orwell's dread vision of life in the 1980's". Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 466
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The black mustachio'd face gazed down from every commanding
corner. There was one on the house front immediately opposite. BIG
BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU, the caption said ....
In the far
distance, a helicopter skimmed down between the roofs, hovered for
an instant like a bluebottle, and darted away again with a curving flight.
It was the Police Patrol, snooping into people's windows.
Id. (quoting GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 4 (1949)).
5 Respect for precedent has traditionally been the hallmark of conservatives. The
current Court, however, has been willing to overturn prior case law quite readily. See
supra text accompanying note 3. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (declaring unconstitutional a
statute requiring physicians to inform patients of the risks of and the alternatives to
abortion); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416(1983) (holding
unconstitutional a statute requiring a twenty-four hour waiting period). These
restrictions (and others) have since been upheld by the new conservative majority.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss1/5

2

19931

THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

conservatives, by contrast, see that document as frozen in time, restricting the
power and authority of the Court to its literal endowments, and bestowing (by

6
design or by default) extensive power on state governments. This
predominant judicial philosophy, drawn against the backdrop of the war on
drugs, has resulted in a perilous path for the heretofore heralded right to
privacy-most notably in the area of criminal law.

II. THE CONCEPT OF PRIVACY

Privacy has been variously defined as the right to live a life of seclusion, the

right "to be free from unwanted publicity, and the right to live without
unwarranted interference by the public in matters with which the public is not

necessarily concerned." 7 To many, it has become synonymous with the "right
to be let alone."8

At least one court has defined privacy as comprising essentially three
aspects:
1) an individual's interest in peace and quiet; 2) an individual's interest
in relaxation and freedom from public scrutiny; and 3) an individual's
interest in public esteem (to hide from public view those habits which
9
be revealed).
might lower the individual's reputation should they
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the right to privacy and has
distinguished two aspects of it: the freedom from being forced to reveal private
information, and the freedom to make personal decisions without
interference. 10 Implicit in this right is freedom from unwarranted
governmental intrusion. 1 It is that aspect of the right, as it relates to particular
areas of criminal law, which will be discussed in this article.
6

Much has been written of the growing conflict among the Court's members over
constitutional interpretation. "Originalists", who eschew any "right" not specifically
enumerated, have been dubbed the "new right" by at least one legal scholar. See BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, THE NEW RIGHT AND THE CONSTITUTION: TURNING BACK THE LEGAL CLOCK

(1990).
7

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1196 (6th ed. 1990).

8

The phrase was given historical notoriety in an article written over a century ago:
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
This article has been credited with the genesis of a whole new field of jurisprudence.
See, e.g., Wilbur Larremore, The Law of Privacy, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 693 (1912). The specific
phrase, "the right to be let alone", however, is ascribed to THOMAS COOLEY, TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF TORTS (1st ed. 1879). See Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of the Right to
Privacy, 21 ARIz. L. REV. 1, 3, n.13 (1979).
9
United States v. Kramer, 711 F.2d 789, 793 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 962
(1983).
1OWhalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).
11

"It is also apparent that the right of privacy is primarily a restraint upon
unwarranted governmental interference or intrusion into those areas deemed to be
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVACY

While there is some debate regarding the existence of an enforceable right to
privacy at common law,1 2 the Supreme Court has not only referenced such a
right, but has imparted constitutional legitimacy to it in a number of cases. 13
In fact, the Court has "found" a basis for the right in several of the constitutional
14
amendments.
The First Amendment's "right to association" 15 carries with it, according to
the Court, the right to keep those associations private. In NAACP v. Alabama,
the Court denied the state of Alabama its request to force the NAACP to
disclose its membership lists. The Court recognized that the inability to keep
one's affiliations private would have a chilling effect on the fundamental right
of association. 16 Subsequent cases similarly affirmed a constitutional right to
17
privacy in one's affiliations.

within the 'protected zones of privacy'." Industrial Foundation of the South v. Texas
Indust. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668,679 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977).
12
Some state courts specifically disavow a common law right to privacy. See, e.g.,
Brown v. American Broadcasting Co., 704 F.2d 1296 (4th Cir. 1983) (applying Virginia
law); Wilson v. Colonial Penn Life Ins. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Minn. 1978) (applying
Minnesota law). Justice Douglas, however, in addressing marital privacy, stated, "We
deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights - older than our political parties,
older than our school system." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
13Probably the most renowned Supreme Court case recognizing this right is
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
14
"Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance... [vjarious guarantees
create zones of privacy." Id. at 484.
15
1n it's entirety, the Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the

freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16
1n 1958, the state of Alabama attempted to enforce a state statute requiring the
NAACP to disclose its membership lists. The organization refused, arguing an unlawful
infringement of the First Amendment's freedom of association. Supported by a
unanimous Court, Justice Harlan agreed with the NAACP:
It is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation
with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute as effective restraint
on freedom of association as the forms of governmental action ....
Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances
be indispensable to the preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,462 (1958). The Court concluded that the disclosure
of such lists could be mandated only upon a showing of a rational and compelling state
interest. None was found here.
17
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); DeGregory v. New Hampshire, 383
U.S. 825 (1966); Gibson v. Florida Leglislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). Although the First Amendment does not enu-
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The Third Amendment's1 8 proscription against housing soldiers in civilian
homes during peacetime certainly illustrates the heightened sense of privacy
accorded one's "castle" by the Constitution. 19 The Fourth Amendment,
however, is explicit in its "right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures."20 This
"privacy clause" has been recognized time and again as the safeguard of
21
individuals against arbitrary governmental intrusions.
In an early (1886) analysis, the Court referred to the Fourth Amendment's
bestowal of an "indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and
private property...." 22 That same opinion declared that the Amendment's
provisions should be "liberally construed," 23 and charged the courts with the
24
responsibility of guarding "against any stealthy encroachments thereon."
Moreover, the Court has condemned warrantless searches as "inconsistent with
the conception of human rights enshrined in the history and basic consti-

merate a specific privacy protection, the Court infers it as a natural extension of the
freedom of association. The Court in Griswold stated:
The right of "association", like the right of belief, is more than the right
to attend a meeting; it includes the right to express one's attitude or
philosophies by membership in a group or by affiliation with it or by
other lawful means. Association in that context is a form of expression of
opinion; and while it is not expressly included in the First Amendment its
existence is necessary in making the express guarantees fully meaningful.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
18
The Amendment reads: "No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any
house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be
prescribed by law." U.S. CONST. amend. m.
19

"The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers 'in any
house' in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy."
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
20
The Fourth Amendment, in its entirety, states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation and specifically describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21
See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
1 (1977); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949);
Lustig v. U.S., 338 U.S. 74 (1949); United States v. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. 632 (1949);
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886).
22

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
231d. at 635.
24 1d.
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tutional documents of English-speaking peoples."25 Indeed, the Court has
specifically denounced warrantless searches in a discourse that is quoted in
many criminal law texts. 26 In it, the Court described the "right of privacy" as
"precious,"27 and stated that "police acting on their own cannot be trusted."2 8
The Court has held for many years, then, that warrantless searches are
unreasonable searches, absent some extraordinary circumstance precluding
29
procurement of judicial authorization.
While the Fourth Amendment has very obvious implications for the right to
be left alone, the Court has relied upon the Fifth Amendment as well to
articulate such a right.30 The interrelationship between privacy and the
privilege against self-incrimination is fundamental. A citizen may lawfully
keep private that information which will implicate him in criminal activity.
This connection can be found even in the early Boyd analysis, which perceived
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as running "almost into each other."31 The

25

Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949).

26

McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948). The entire passage is as follows:
We are not dealing with formalities. The presence of a search warrant
serves a high function. Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police.
This was not done to shield criminals nor to make the home a safe haven
for illegal activities. It was done so that an objective mind might weigh
the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law. The right
of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of those
whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals. Power
is a heady thing; and history shows that the police acting on their own
cannot be trusted. And so the Constitution requires a magistrate to
pass on the desires of the police before they violate the privacy of the
home. We cannot be true to that constitutional requirement and excuse
the absence of a search warrant without a showing by those who seek
exemption from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the
situation made that course imperative.
Id. at 455-56.
27

1d. at 455.

28

1d. at 456.

29
"Where ... officers are not responding to an emergency, there must be compelling
reasons to justify the absence of a warrant." McDonald 335 U.S. at 454. Today, there are
so many exceptions to the search warrant requirement that it can be argued that the
"compelling reasons" criteria is now suspect. Indeed, this article will attempt to illustrate
that the Fourth Amendment has been severely compromised in the course of the Court's
shift to the right.
30

The Amendment states, in pertinent part: "No person.., shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law.. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
31Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,635 (1886).
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right to keep private one's belief's, politics, practices and habits is implicit in
32
the right to remain silent.

A largely unexplored (by the Court),33 but perhaps fertile ground for a
constitutional privacy protection is the Ninth Amendment. That Amendment
promises that: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."34
In a departure from the Court's rather conspicuous avoidance of this
Amendment for the past 200 years, Justice Goldberg, (with Chief Justice Warren
and Justice Brennan concurring) braved its judicially frightening waters in the
1965 case of Griswoldv. Connecticut.35 Here, the Court held that a state may not
constitutionally intrude upon the right of marital privacy by forbidding the use
of contraceptives. 36 In so finding, the Court relied heavily on the concept of a
privacy protection embodied in the Bill of Rights, and emphasized in support
thereof, the First and Fourth Amendments. In the concurring opinion by Justice
Goldberg, however, the Ninth Amendment was brought to life. He stated: "The
language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the framers of the
Constitution believed that there are additional fundamental rights, protected
from governmental infringement, which exist alongside those fundamental
rights specifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional amendments." 37
Justice Goldberg opined that even though the right to privacy did not appear
literally in the Bill of Rights, it (referring to the right of marital privacy) was
protected under the rubric of the Ninth Amendment. 38

32

For cases acknowledging a right to privacy in the Fifth Amendment (although not
always granting same to the defendant) see Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974);
Califomia v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); and Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928). Evidence of the current Court's intent to diminish, or perhaps eliminate a privacy
basis in the Fifth Amendment, however, may be seen in Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion in United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 618 (1984): "[t]he Fifth Amendment
provides absolutely no protection for the contents of private papers of any kind." Of
course, the moderates on the Bench strongly disagree.
33

For a comprehensive treatise on the Amendment, see RANDY E. BARNETr, THE
RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HSTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT
(1989).
34

U.S. CONST. amend. IX.

35381 U.S. 479 (1965).
36[d.
371d. at 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
381d. at 491 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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This right of privacy has also found support in the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 9 In Roe v. Wade,40 the Court struck down a Texas abortion law
as violative of the Due Process Clause of that Amendment. The Court stated
that "personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty'. . . are included in this guarantee of personal
privacy."41 Justice Blackmun, in his dissenting opinion in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Serv.,42 refers to the right to privacy as "a species of 'liberty' protected
by the Due Process Clause."43 This is supported by the Court's declaration in
1949 that "[t]he security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the
police ... is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in 'the concept of
ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the States through the Due
Process Clause."44
The right to privacy, then-the "right to be let alone-the most
45
comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by civilized men" -is
guaranteed by more than just the Fourth Amendment, but by others as well,
and "emanates from the totality of the constitutional scheme under which we
live."46 Or does it? With five new Justices appointed since 1981, and the
appointment of William Rehnquist as Chief Justice in 1986, we are beginning
to see a divergence from precedence and a markedly restrained interpretation
of the Bill of Rights in the realm of privacy.
IV. THE CRIMINAL ARENA

A. Aerial Surveillance - Flying in the Face of Katz
1. On the Runway
It is hardly likely that the framers4 7 of our Constitution could have foreseen
the scientific developments which have made possible penetrating views of
39

The relevant portion of the Amendment states: "nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law...". U.S. CONST. amend.

XM.
40410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4

l1Id. at 152 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).

42492 U.S. 490 (1989) (Blackmun J., dissenting).
43

1d. at 548.

44

Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).

45

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

46poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
47

Such a phenomenon was anticipa ted over one hundred years ago by legal scholars,
however,
The intensity and complexity of life.., have rendered... necessary
some retreat from the world, and man ... has become more sensitive
... so that solitude and privacy have become more essential ... [but]
modem enterprise and invention have, through invasion upon his
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our personal lives.48 Application of the broad principles of the Bill of Rights to
these technological advances has been difficult and disjointed, 49 especially
with regard to Fourth Amendment issues.5 0 In most of the cases cited here,
technology and the priority of law enforcement have prevailed over individual
rights. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the Supreme Court's sanction of
warrantless aerial surveillance.
In 1928, the Court upheld the wiretapping of a telephone, finding that such
intrusion was not the kind of search or seizure contemplated by the Fourth
Amendment. 51 Significantly, the Court found that a physical trespass 52 was
necessary before there could be a determination that the search was
unreasonable. 53 By 1967, however, the Court had changed its mind. In Katz v.
United States,54 the Court held that "the Fourth Amendment protects people,

privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than
could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.
Warren and Brandeis, supra note 8, at 196.
48
See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (permitting warrantless helicopter
surveillance of citizens); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (holding that the use
of specially trained dogs to detect narcotics in luggage at airports is not a "search" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)
(asserting that depositors have no expectation of privacy in information such as checks,
deposit slips, etc. voluntarily conveyed to banks and their employees); Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1949) (allowing police to obtain, without a warrant, a listing of
numbers dialed by a customer from the phone company); and Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925) (permitting the warrantless search of automobiles if police have
probable cause to believe contraband will be found therein).
49

See, e.g., People v. Sabo, 230 Cal. Rptr. 170 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1986) cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1058 (1987). Here, the lower court held that a warrantless search by officers in
a helicopter flying in navigable airspace was unreasonable. Because this reasoning ran
counter to the Supreme Court's holdings in Dow Chemical v. United States, 476 U.S.
227 (1986), and California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), it came as a surprise when the
Court denied certiorari. Chief Justice Rehnquist, with Justice White, however, filed a
dissent to the denial, saying the lower court's decision was a "highly questionable
interpretation of our decision in California v. Ciraolo." Sabo, 481 U.S. at 1059. (Rehnquist
J., dissenting).
50
'"he course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures... has not... run
smooth." Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610,618 (1961) (FrankfurterJ., concurring).
51

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).

52 See, e.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (upholding the use of a
concealed microphone because there was no unauthorized entry into a constitutionally
protected area).
5301mstead, 277 U.S. at 466. Justice Brandeis was prescient. In his dissenting opinion,
he urged the Court to consider that "our contemplation cannot be only of what has been
butof what may be." Id. at473 (BrandeisJ., dissenting). In essence, Brandeis was warning
of further technological advances which could despoil the privacy of citizens' lives.
54389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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not places."55 The Court, in essence, "discarded the property-based approach
of Olmstead and adopted a privacy based approach." 56 Until recently, Katz has
been regarded as a benchmark case for Fourth Amendment issues. 57
Katz involved the use, by law enforcement officers, of an electronic device to
monitor phone conversations taking place in a public telephone booth. The
device was attached, without prior judicial authorization, to the outside of the
booth. Relying on precedent, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction,
reasoning that because no physical intrusion of the phone booth had occurred,
there could be no Fourth Amendment violation. 58 The Supreme Court granted
review.
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, noted that "what a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not subject
to Fourth Amendment protection.... But what he seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected...."59 The reasoning makes clear the emphasis on an individual's

reasonable expectation of privacy, rather than on the physical location of the
challenged search. The Court readily concluded that Katz possessed a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his phone conversations, even though they
took place in a public phone booth. Again, the location holds weight in the
analysis only to the degree that it is relevant to the question of whether the

individual's privacy expectation is reasonable. Noting the advances in
investigative technology, the Court stated specifically that "the reach of the
Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion
into any given enclosure."60
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion established the familiar two-prong test
for determining whether the Fourth Amendment had been violated:
1) did the individual manifest a subjective expectation of privacy, and
2) is that expectation 6 1one that society is prepared to accept as
objectively reasonable?
Reversing the defendant's conviction, the Court affirmed that individuals are
entitled to the enjoyment of privacy whenever and wherever that presumption
is reasonable. Justice Harlan's test, while sound in principle, opened broad
areas of discretion to the Court in application.

55Id. at 351.
56 Bradley W. Foster, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance and the Right to Privacy: The Flight
of the FourthAmendment, 56 J. AIR L. & COM. 719, 727 (1991).
57
This case is also significant because there was only one dissent (by Justice Black).
58 Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1966).
59

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).

60

1d. at 353.
1d. at 361 (Harlan J., concurring).

61
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In 1984, the Supreme Court reviewed the "open fields" doctrine established
sixty years earlier. 62 Oliver v. United States63 presented facts, which, in view of
the Court's assertions in Katz, called for a new constitutional analysis. In Oliver,
and its companion case, law enforcement officers (without probable cause)
ignored "No Trespassing" signs to perform warrantless searches of secluded
areas of the petitioners' properties. In each case, the trial court determined that
the defendant had exhibited sufficient evidence of a privacy expectation to
render the officers' warrantless search unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. In each case, the Supreme Court disagreed.
At the outset in Oliver, the Court acknowledged a distinction between the
curtilage 65 within which a citizen (at least theoretically) may possess a
reasonable expectation of privacy, and neighboring fields, where such an
expectation would be deemed unreasonable. While conceding "the overriding

62
The "open fields" doctrine was delineated in Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57
(1924). In this case, federal agents had concealed themselves on the defendant's
property, about fifty to one hundred yards away from the house, and from that vantage
point, observed Hester transporting moonshine. The officers began pursuit; one even
fired his pistol. The Court characterized the land surrounding the house as "open fields".
Relying on the explicit language of the Fourth Amendment, and its specific reference to
"persons, houses, papers, and effects", the Court concluded that the Amendment
provided no protection to such open areas. There is no reasonable expectation of privacy
in open fields, even if privately owned. Id. at 58-59.
63466 U.S. 170 (1984). Oliver owned a farm in Kentucky upon which it was claimed
that he was growing marijuana. Narcotics agents drove onto Oliver's property, and
passed his house to a locked gate upon which a "No Trespassing" sign had been placed.
The agents exited their vehicle and walked around the gate and along the road, passing
a bam and a camper. About a mile from the defendant's home, but on his property, they
located a field of marijuana. In its findings of fact, the trial court concluded that this was
not an "open field". The defendant had done all that could reasonably be expected to
asserthis privacy rights in theproperty. Hehad posted "No Trespassing" signs at regular
intervals, and had locked the gate at the entrance to the farm. The trial court noted
further that the field where the plants were found was highly secluded, bounded in its
entirety by woods, fences, or embankments, all of which precluded observation from
any point of public access. Id. at 173-74.
64
Maine v. Thornton, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). In this case, officers disregarded the "No
Trespassing" signs posted by defendant Thornton and followed a path between his
house and a neighbor's house to a secluded area where two patches of marijuana plants
were enclosed by chicken wire. The trial court, in this case as well, concluded that the
defendant had exhibited sufficient evidence of a privacy expectation to render the
officers' warrantless search unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 174. (The
Supreme Court heard Oliver and Thornton on the same day and delivered a single
opinion addressing both cases).
65
"Curtilage" is defined as "those outbuildings which are directly and intimately
connected with the habitation and in proximity thereto and the lands or grounds
surrounding the dwelling which are necessary and convenient and habitually used for
family purposes and carrying on domestic employment." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 384
(6th ed. 1990).
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respect for the sanctity of the home,"66 and, presumably, its environs, the Court
asserted forcefully that a reasonable expectation of privacy within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment cannot be created by erecting fences around a
property or posting "no trespassing" signs. The Court concluded that, while
such precautions may discourage members of the public from entering upon
the property, they do not "legitimize" a privacy expectation in the sense
required by the Fourth Amendment. Justice Powell, writing for the majority,
reiterated Justice Harlan: "The Amendment does not protect the merely
subjective expectation of privacy, but only those expectations that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable." 67
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens in his dissenting
opinion, argued that society does recognize as reasonable a privacy expectation
by a landowner who fences and posts his property in such a manner. They
would have held that: "private land marked in a manner sufficient to render
entry thereon a criminal trespass under the law of the state in which the land
lies is protected by the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable
searches and seizures." 68 The majority, however, refused to embrace this logic,
and chose to grant to police the power to enter onto open land, albeit fenced
and posted, without a warrant, and without probable cause to believe that
69
criminal activity is occurring.
From Justice Harlan's test, the ensuing question was inevitable: who
determines what society accepts as "reasonable?" 70 Who measures society's

66

Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178.

67

1d. at 177.

68

1d. at 195 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

69

1d. at 182-84. Interestingly, Justice Scalia, in a more recent dissenting opinion,
makes the same point as the dissenters in Oliver. The Court struck down the death
penalty for a juvenile as contrary to the "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society". Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 864-65 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). Justice Scalia
assailed his colleagues' presumptions to knowledge of societal opinion. "Of course the
risk of assessing evolving standards is that it is all too easy to believe that evolution has
culminated in one's own views." Id. at 865. He goes on to suggest that the only reliable
standard of determining society's opinion is the legislation enacted by its
representatives. Id. Thus, he concludes that the enactment of Oklahoma's death penalty
statute reflects society's view that such a punishment is acceptable. Id. at 865. This
argument runs parallel to that presented in the Oliver dissent (by Justices Marshall,
Brennan and Stevens) that society regards the warrantless entry onto private and posted
property by police as violative of state trespass laws.
7
OFor a lengthy discussion of the Katz two-prong test and a critical analysis of the
"reasonableness" standard, see generally Gerald K. Freund, Look Up In The Sky, It's A
Bird, It's A Plane,It's Reasonableness, 20 Sw. U. L. REV. 195 (1991). Freund asserts that the
"reasonableness" standard is uniquely vulnerable to abuse by the Court, and has been
used as a justification for the diminution of Fourth Amendment protections.
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values? Is it legislators (as Justice Scalia has suggested), 71 the media, 72 or the
Court? If it is the Court, there are some inherent difficulties: 1) that the Justices
are so removed from the lives of normal citizens that they cannot accurately
make that assessment, 73 and 2) that their determinations will be colored by
their own predilections. 74
2. Takeoff
Two recent and closely decided cases have established that law enforcement
officers may even take their search to the air when trudging upon the land is
too tiresome, illegal, or may alert the landowner. These cases hold that it is

constitutionally permissible for police to fly over property at low, but legal
altitudes, to seek out criminal activity. According to the Court, such activity
does not constitute a search. Therefore, no warrant is needed, nor is there a
probable cause requirement. 75 In so holding, the Court relied on the simple
inquiry of whether the officer had a legal right to be in the position from which
he made his observations. The answer to that question, it seems, is dispositive
of the second question of the Katz test.
Californiav. Ciraolo7 6 was decided in 1986. Here, officers flew at an altitude
of one thousand feet over the defendant's property. They had received an
anonymous telephone tip that Ciraolo was growing marijuana in his back yard.
The yard, however, was shielded from public view by two fences (one six feet,
the other ten feet high). Based upon the anonymous tip, officers secured a
private plane and flew, within navigable airspace, over the defendant's yard.

71Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,865 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72

See infra notes 214-217 and accompanying text.

73
That particular criticism was insinuated regarding Justice O'Connor's majority
opinion in Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991). In his dissent, Justice Marshall states,
"1agree that the appropriate question is whether a passenger who is approached during
such a sweep 'would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter'. What I cannot understand is how a majority can possibly suggest an
affirmative answer to this question." Id. at 2391. See also California v. Hodari, 111 S. Ct.
1547,1553 n.4 (1991) (stating Justice Stevens' criticism of Justice Scalia as promulgating
an "ivory-towered analysis of the real world ... fail[ing] to describe the experience of
many residents.").
74

Justice Scalia has voiced this concern. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 865, 871, and 873
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
75
Foster takes issue with the Court's conclusion that such aerial surveillance is not a
"search" under the Fourth Amendment. He states: "[wihen an officer circles a person's
home and peers into his windows.., what on earth is he doing up there but searching?".
Foster, supra note 56, at 759 (paraphrasing Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectiveson the
FourthAmendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 396 (1974)).

76476 U.S. 207 (1986).
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The officers observed marijuana plants, photographed them, and used this
information as a basis to obtain a search warrant. 77
The Court reduced the analysis to the two essential inquiries established in
Katz: "[F]irst, had the defendant manifested a subjective expectation of privacy
in the object of the challenged search? Second, is society willing to recognize
that expectation as objectively reasonable?" 78 Ciraolopassed the first test,79 but
failed the second. The Court reasoned that because the officers were in a legally
acceptable location for viewing such activity, (within public navigable
airspace), their actions did not fall under any Fourth Amendment restraint. For
that reason, the defendant's manifested expectation of privacy could not be one
which society was ready or willing to recognize as reasonable, or to protect.
A more recent case, Floridav. Riley,80 was decided using the same logic. Like

Ciraolo, an anonymous tip prompted law enforcement officials to take to the
air to view what they could not lawfully observe from the ground. The officer
circled the enclosed property in a helicopter at a height of four hundred feet to
observe marijuana plants through two missing panels in a greenhouse roof.81
The Court, once again, concluded that the search was not unreasonable even

though conducted without a warrant and without probable cause, because the
officer was within the airspace accessible to the public.82 The majority did not
find any constitutional relevance to the fact that police observations were
specifically targeted for particular persons and places. They drew no
distinction between the inadvertent glance of an air traveler and the purposeful
search of a police officer.83

771d.
78

at 209.

d. at 211.

79
The Court readily concluded that Ciraolo had made apparent his subjective intent
of securing his property from view. It noted, however, that a passenger of a large truck
or two-tiered bus might have been able to observe the defendant's property from that
vantage point. Id.
8O488 U.S. 445 (1989).
81

1d. at 448.

82
'The Fourth Amendment simply does not require the police traveling in the public
airways at this altitude to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible to the
naked eye." Id. at 450, (quoting Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215).
83
The Court thought "novel" the California Court of Appeals' holding that Ciraolo's
reasonable expectation of privacy had been violated because of the officers' "focused"
observations. In rejecting this reasoning, the Court referred to the distinction as
irrelevant. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 n.2 (1986). Justice Powell, writing
for the dissent, argued, "the Court fails to acknowledge the qualitative difference
between police surveillance and other uses made of the airspace. Members of the public
use airspace for travel, business, or pleasure, not for the purpose of observing activities
taking place within residential yards." Id. at 224 (Powell, J., dissenting). This criticism
may have been rendered moot, however, by the Court's recent ruling in Horton v.
California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990). Here, the Court explicitly removed "inadvertency" as a
required element to justify police seizures under the plain view doctrine. While this case
dealt with the purposeful search for items not named in a search warrant, the
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The holdings in these cases appear to fly in the face of the principle cited in
Katz that the Fourth Amendment "protects people, not places."84 Katz
established the premise that the lawfulness of a search did not depend upon
whether there was an actual physical intrusion by police, or their physical
position. Rather, the appropriate inquiry was whether the surveillance had
invaded a constitutionally reasonable expectation of privacy. The majority has
now repudiated Katz by returning to property law to answer that question, and
by resting its logic on whether the police were in a place to which the public
had access. The Court focuses its attention on the manner of surveillance (since
ground access was not lawfully permissible in these cases), rather than the
citizen's legitimate privacy interests.
The absurdity of the majority's argument that both Ciraolo and Riley could
have been observed from the air by those in either private or commercial
aircraft was noted in the85 dissenting opinion. Justice Powell called such risks
"virtually non-existent" and "simply too trivial to protect against."86 The
larger question, however, is whether the mere possibility of observation renders
privacy expectations unreasonable. It is a gross distortion of Katz to decree that
any public exposure or risk thereof, no matter how remote, precludes Fourth
Amendment protection. 87 The Court in Katz stated forthrightly that "what (a
citizen) seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected." 88 Airspace is certainly accessible to the
public, but that fact in and of itself, should not render "public" a citizen's
backyard as the Court seems to conclude.
It is no leap of logic to conclude that, were Katz to be decided today under
the reasoning of these cases, the Court would find that Katz "knowingly
exposed" the contents of his discussion because a passerby might have
overheard parts of the phone conversation. Governmental agents, therefore,

groundwork has been laid for the approval of such searches (of constitutionally
protected areas) where no warrant exists. Even if the Court were to conclude that aerial
surveillance by police constituted a "search" with its attendant Fourth Amendment
considerations, such conduct may now be considered permissible under the "new" plain
view doctrine.
84
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). This includes the notion that the
Amendment reflects a choice that our society should be one in which citizens, "dwell in
reasonable security and freedom from surveillance." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10,14 (1948).
85
86
87

California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 223 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting).
1d. (Powell, J., dissenting).
For further discussion of the Court's repudiation of Katz, see Foster, supra note 56,

at 753-59. This author asks: Do inadvertent acts justify intentional governmental acts?
See also Brian J. Serr, Great Expectationsof Privacy: A New Model for Fourth Amendment
Protection,73 MINN. L. REV. 583 (1989). "This analysis, although perhaps commendable
for its simplicity, begs the constitutional question and undercuts the spirit of both Katz

and the fourth amendment." Id. at 598.
88Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,351 (1976).
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would have committed no Fourth Amendment wrong by eavesdropping
themselves. The use of the electronic bugging device would be no obstacle to
this conclusion, as it is analogous to the aircraft used in Ciraolo and Riley. The
Court's reliance on a property law approach to these Fourth Amendment issues

is indication that Katz and its principles may very well have been implicitly
overturned.
There is an even greater concern, however. On the heels of Ciraolocame Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States.89 In this case, the Court found to be
constitutionally permissible the Environmental Protection Agency's
warrantless aerial photography of Dow's industrial plant. 90 In the supporting
opinion, the Court emphasized that while commercial establishments are
protected by the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures, that protection is somewhat less stringent than that

enjoyed by a homeowner. 91 From that premise, the Court's analysis turned,
once again, to the position from which the search was conducted and the
manner of surveillance. Like Ciraolo,and its offspring Riley, significant reliance
was placed on the fact that there was no physical trespass since the plane was
within navigable airspace. That fact, coupled with the Court's finding that Dow
had a diminished expectation of privacy from aerial observation, established
to the Court's satisfaction that no constitutional infraction had occurred. 92
Although this case is consonant with the Court's rulings in Ciraoloand Riley,
there is an additional factor in Dow which may set precedent for more invasive
governmental searches. While Ciraolo and Riley involved only naked-eye
observations, Dow involved the use of sophisticated photographic equipment.
It was revealed that magnification of the photographs taken would permit
identification of objects as small as one-half inch in diameter. 93 Refusing to
89476 U.S. 227 (1986).

90After conducting a consensual administrative inspection of Dow's 2,000 acre plant
in Midland, Michigan, the EPA requested a second inspection. When Dow refused, the
agency, rather than obtain a warrant for an administrative search, hired a commercial
aerial photographer to take pictures of the facility from altitudes as low as twelve
hundred feet. Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 230.

91The Court stated, "[tihe intimate activities associated with family privacy and the
home and its curtilage simply do not reach the outdoor areas or spaces between
structures and buildings of a manufacturing plant". Id. at 236. But see Seth H. Ruzi,
Comment, Reviving Trespass-Based Search Analyses Under the Open View Doctrine: Dow

Chemical v. U.S., 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 191 (1988) for an analysis asserting that the Fourth
Amendment extends to commercial environs.
92

The Court noted that Dow had taken no precautions against aerialintrusions. Dow
Chemical, 476 U.S. at 237 n.4. Precautions against physical intrusions, however, were
quite extensive. An eight foot high chain link fence completely surrounded the plant.
Security guards, closed circuit television monitors, motion detectors, and an elaborate
alarm system were all employed to ensure privacy. In addition, the open air plants were
deliberately placed in the center of the complex to protect against physical observation
from the ground. Id. at 241 (Powell, J., dissenting).
93

1d. at 238.
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squarely address the issue, 94 the Court dismissed Dow's concern regarding this
technological capability with the statement, "the mere fact that human vision
is enhanced somewhat, at least to the degree here, does not give rise to
95
constitutional problems." The Court gives observers little hope to believe that
law enforcement officers engaged in warrantless aerial surveillance of citizens'
homes would not be permitted to use high magnification photography of the

curtilage.
The outcome of Dow reflects yet another closely decided case. Four justices,

96
only one of whom remains on the High Court today, dissented. These four

dissenting justices argued that the standard for determining whether or not a
warrantless governmental search is constitutionally permissible should not
rest upon whether there was an actual physical trespass, nor by the method of
surveillance, but by "reference to the privacy interests that a free society
recognizes as reasonable."9 7 In Katz, the individual's precautions against
invasions of privacy were central to the determination of whether the

expectation was reasonable, and therefore enforceable. Under these rulings,

however, even extraordinary precautions against inquisitive eyes are
insufficient to protect citizens from police intrusions. Such intrusions are being
found by the Court to be almost presumptively reasonable.
Under the current case law, citizens can no longer rely on the long-held
98
premise that, absent some "grave emergency" or consent, the government

must obtain a warrant before intruding upon their privacy. The warrant
interpretation of what constitutes a
presumption has given way to the Court's
"reasonable expectation of privacy."99 Under the current Court's reasoning, it
appears that citizens' "reasonable expectations of privacy" must change as

technology becomes more advanced. Rather than drawing a bright line behind
which individuals are protected from governmental intrusion, the line will

move, bend, and sometimes disappear. According to the Court, the definition

94

Interestingly, the Court could not rely on the "inadvertent air traveler" rationale of
Ciraolo and Riley, since few commercial air passengers possess $22,000 precision
mapping cameras. See Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 250 n.12 (Powell, J., dissenting).
95

1d. at 238. Ironically, Dow had established strict policies prohibiting the use of any
photographic equipment on the premises, or the release of any pictures of the facility
without prior approval by the management. Id. at 241 (Powell, J., dissenting.)
96

Those dissenting in Dow were Justices Powell, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.
OnlyJustice Blackmun remains on the High Court today. The others have been replaced
by Justices Anthony Kennedy, David Souter and Clarence Thomas.
97476 U.S. at 251 (Powell, J., dissenting).
98

McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948).

99

See infra note 149 for further criticism of the Court's separation of the privacy and
warrant clauses of the Fourth Amendment. See infra notes 182-83 for comments
regarding the unworkability of the "reasonableness test".
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of "reasonable" will turn upon scientific advances. If it can be done, the citizen
should reasonably expect that it will be done. 10 0
B. Trash
Courts have applied the Katz two-prong test to warrantless searches of
citizens' trash as well. In United States v. Kramer,101 the defendant argued that
police had violated his privacy rights by entering onto his property to seize,
without a warrant, trash he had put out for collection. The cans were placed
just inside a knee-high chain fence which ran along the curb. The items seized
by police were inside plastic trash bags, and inside plastic trash containers with
plastic lids. The evidence seized implicated Kramer in drug trafficking. 102
The court reasoned that the entrance by police onto Kramer's property by
only a few feet was not an invasion of privacy as envisioned by the Fourth
Amendment. 10 3 Concluding that there was no legitimate or objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy once the trash had been so placed, the court
found the seizure constitutionally permissible. When the Supreme Court
denied certiorari, the groundwork was laid for Greenwood.
Californiav. Greenwood1 04 involved similar factual elements. The defendant
placed his trash in opaque bags at curbside for pickup as local law required.
Police seized the bags and used the incriminating evidence found therein to
obtain search warrants. The execution of those warrants resulted in
Greenwood's arrest. The trial court dismissed the charges on the grounds that
the defendant's privacy rights had been violated 10 5 and California appealed.

10

OFor a disturbing recitation of insults by helicopter surveillance, see Gayle J.
Mayfield, Comment, Floridav. Riley: The Beginning of the End or 'Big Brother'?, 12 CRIM.
JUSTICE J. 53, 59-60 (1990). The article provides examples of affidavits from California
residents who were harassed by helicopters employed by California's Campaign
Against Marijuana Planting (CAMP). Probably the most offensive account is one
helicopter chasing two running and terrified twelve year old girls. See The National
Organization For the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. Mullen, 795 F.2d 276 (9th
Cir. 1986).
101711 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 962 (1983).
102

1d. at 791-92.
103"Every trespass, by definition, invades someone's right of possession, but not every
government trespass violates the Fourth Amendment. Only those that infringe a privacy
interest do." Id. at 794. (citations omitted)
104486 U.S. 35 (1988).
105d at 38.
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Rejecting traditional abandonment language, 1°6 the Court applied the Katz
10 7
test and found no invasion of any protectable privacy interest. The Court
explained that placing trash at curbside for pickup by a third party, exposes the
property to public view and scrutiny and therefore terminates any previously
held privacy right. The Court further explained that scavengers,
curiosity-seekers, dogs and others could easily explore the containers so
it
placed. If the trash could be legitimately exposed to this cast of characters,108
would be unreasonable to deny the same freedom of action to the police.
Recognizing that Greenwood had manifested a subjective expectation of privacy
by using opaque, sealed containers, the Court found that society was not
willing to confer objective legitimacy to that expectation. Essentially, according
to the Court, there is no reasonable or protectable expectation of privacy in
trash left at curbside for pickup.
Under an analysis truly faithful to the letter and spirit of Katz, however,
Greenwood would have prevailed. The two cases are factually analogous. Each
involved a "container" (a phone booth and a trash can, respectively); each
involved a "public" setting; and in each case, the defendant expressed a
subjective expectation of privacy. In a rather feeble justification, the Greenwood
Court concluded that the likelihood of public intrusion was greater regarding
trash than conversations in a phone booth. This reasoning eschews the
"person-oriented" approach (as opposed to the "property-oriented" approach)
espoused in Katz. In addition, the Greenwood Court failed to appreciate the
interconnectedness of the two prongs of the Katz test. Katz focused its analysis
on the actions of the citizen, and explicitly rejected location as the focal point
of the issue. By routinely accepting the defendant's assertions of a subjective
expectation of privacy, and then equally routinely rejecting arguments that

106

Historic property law tenets hold that two questions must be answered to
determine whether property has been abandoned: 1) whether the owner intended to
abandon the property, and 2) whether the retrieval of the property was "accomplished
by an intrusion upon the curtilage". WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE
ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 2.6c, at 476 (2d ed. 1987).
At least theoretically, application of property law would invalidate a seizure of
trash placed within the curtilage of the home. In addition, the defendant's argument
that municipal law required him to dispose of trash in the manner used would logically
negate the volitional element necessary to prove intent. "The Greenwood majority failed
to acknowledge that if a citizen must break the law to avoid voluntarily exposing the
contents of his or her garbage can to public scrutiny, the crux of the issue is compulsion,
not consent." Julie A. Line, Note, Fourth Amendment - Further Erosion of the Warrant
RequirementforUnreasonableSearches and Seizures: The WarrantlessTrash Search Exception,
79 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 623, 645, (1988).
See also Jon E. Lemole, From Katz to Greenwood: Abandonment Gets Recycled from the
Trash Pile - Can Our GarbageBe Saved from the Court's Rummaging Hands?, 41 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 581 (1991) (arguing persuasively that the Greenwood Court's privacy
language is a thin disguise for a traditional abandonment approach).
107 Califomia v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,40 (1988).
1081d.
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those expectations are objectively reasonable, the Court failed to grasp the
essence of Katz. It so severed the two prongs as to render each meaningless.
What about trash not at curbside? This question was raised in a recent
appellate ruling, United States v. Hedrick.109 On this occassion the trash was
thirty feet from the street and eighteen feet from the sidewalk, well onto the
defendant's property. Still, the opaque bags in the closed trash containers were
placed at that location for regular pickup. Police, hiding behind trees and
bushes as they approached the suspect's house, seized without a warrant, items
which had been placed in those cans.11 0 Does an individual retain a legitimate
privacy interest in trash located well within the curtilage of the home?
Containers, other than garbage cans, clearly cannot be subject to a
warrantless police search absent consent or some articulable exigency.111
However, the court noted that such containers, whether at curbside or well onto
the property, may be examined by members of the public, and are eventually
removed by a third party. These distinctions from other types of containers
were sufficient to defeat a Fourth Amendment privacy claim. Moreover,
although the intent to convey the property to another in and of itself could not
effectively terminate a legitimate expectation of privacy, itwas a factor the court
considered in applying the critical test of public access. 112
Nor did the court conclude that the willingness of the public to trespass on
the property of another to inspect his trash could necessarily defeat a
reasonable expectation of privacy.113 In this case, however, it was noted that
the property was placed in a location readily accessible to the third party
collector, and to public view. Under these circumstances, the defendant
"knowingly exposed"114 his property to the public for Fourth Amendment
purposes, and lost any protectable privacy interest.

109922 F.2d 396 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 147 (1991).
1101d. at 397.

111SeeHedrick,922 F.2d at 399. The court discusses the articulable exigency by stating:
The Court has never indicated, however, that a container such as a
backpack which was placed at the side of a driveway within the curtilage
of a house could be searched without a warrant; in fact, caselaw indicates
that such a container could not be searched because its contents are not
in plain view and have not been knowingly exposed to the public. We
must now determine, however, whether that container may be searched
if it is a garbage can. The result can differ only if there is something in
the nature of a garbage can which results in the exposure of its contents
to the public.

Id.
112-[Tlhe proper focus under Greenwood is whether the garbage was readily accessible
to the public so as to render any expectation of privacy objectively unreasonable." Id. at
400.
113United States v. Hedrick, 922 F.2d 396 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 147

(1991).
114Id.
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The distinction between the containers relied upon in Hedrick ignores prior
case law. In Robbins v. California,115 the Court stated, "Unless the container is
such that its contents may be said to be in plain view, those contents are fully
117
protected by the Fourth Amendment."116 A year later, in United States v. Ross,
the Court referenced a "virtually unanimous agreement in Robbins ... that a

constitutional distinction between 'worthy' and 'unworthy' containers would
be improper."118
Likewise, a citizen's intent to transfer the property to a third person should
have no weight in assessing his privacy interest in the object. "Were it otherwise,
a letter or package would lose all Fourth Amendment protection when placed
in a mailbox or other depository with the 'express purpose' of entrusting it to
the postal officer or private carrier... ."119
Nor should the possibility of unlawful invasion by members of the public
be dispositive. "The mere possibility that unwelcome meddlers might open and
rummage through the containers does not negate the expectation of privacy in
their contents any more than the possibility of a burglary negates an
expectation of privacy in the home.... "120
Yet, some or all of these factors were used to justify the Court's conclusions
that society does not recognize a legitimate privacy interest in trash placed on
one's property for pickup. Nevertheless, it is difficult to accept the notion that
feel affront at scavengers, neighbors or
the members of the Court would12not
1
police going through their trash.
The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Hedrickis a clear signal of its tacit
approval. It would seem that the closer to one's domicile the trash container is
located, the more reasonable (and therefore protectable) the expectation of
privacy. The line being drawn, however, is inching its way to the doorstep.
Under the current reasoning, law enforcement officers may, should they have
the time and the inclination, go from house to house, without a warrant and
without probable cause, systematically searching the trash containers of each
resident on trash pick-up eve.

115435 U.S. 420 (1981).
116

1d. at 427.

117456 U.S. 798 (1982).
118

1d. at 822-23.

119 California

v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
d. at 54 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
121"Most of us, I believe, would be incensed to discover a meddler - whether neighbor,
120

a reporter, or a detective - scrutinizing our sealed trash containers to discover some
detail of our personal lives." Id. at 51 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also infra notes 214-17

and accompanying text.
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C. Arrests
The Supreme Court, in the 1968 case of Terry v. Ohio,122 found that it was
constitutionally permissible for police officers to temporarily stop an
individual if that officer could articulate facts which caused him to reasonably
suspect that criminal activity was afoot. This holding was a departure from the
long-accepted Fourth Amendment standard of probable cause as the threshold
requirement for interference with the liberty of a citizen.
Two factors guided the Court to its conclusion. The first was the reasoning
of a case decided the prior year: Camarav. Municipal Court.123 In examining a
warrantless administrative search, the Court applied a balancing test for Fourth
Amendment considerations. That balancing test called for the Court to weigh
the government's interest in conducting such searches against the individual's
interest in privacy. In Terry, the Court decided to apply this balancing test to
124
law enforcement protocol.
The second factor guiding the Court to its (then) novel conclusion was the
nature of the case itself. Officer McFadden had reason to believe that a violent
felony was about to occur. He feared for his immediate safety and that of others.
Although the information he had did not rise to the level of probable cause as
required by the Fourth Amendment, he restrained the defendant, and during
the ensuing patdown located a weapon. Under these circumstances, and
applying the balancing test of Camara, the Court found the officer's actions
reasonable. The effect of the Terry decision was to substantially lower the level
of proof required for police to lawfully interfere with citizens. Recognizing the
need for caution, however, the Court advised: "We do not retreat from our
holdings that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial
approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure ... or that in
most instances failure to comply with the warrant requirement can only be
"125
excused by exigent circumstances ....

122392 U.S. 1 (1968).
123387 U.S. 523 (1967).
124

"[Tlhere is 'no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing
the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails'."
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
536-37 (1967)). Scholars, however, have noted the difficulty inherent in applying such a
nebulous test to fundamental Fourth Amendment issues. See, e.g., Robert Berkley
Harper, Has the Replacement of "Probable Cause" with "ReasonableSuspicion" Resulted in
the Creationof the Best ofAll PossibleWorlds?, 22 AKRoNL. REV. 13 (1988); RonaldJ. Bacigal,

The Fourth Amendment in Flux: The Rise and Fall of ProbableCause, 1979 U. ILL. L. F. 763
(1979); Christine M. Wiseman, The "Reasonableness" of the Investigative Detention: An "Ad
Hoc" ConstitutionalTest, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 641 (1984).
12STerry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). See also Terry's companion case, Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (condemning a search where the officer had no reason to fear

for his safety).
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This warning was not enough for Justice Douglas, however. He saw the
decision as taking "a long step down the totalitarian path."126 The succeeding
erosion of Terry's original holding bears witness to those fears. Terry called for
a particularized suspicion to be articulated in order to uphold a temporary
seizure based upon less than probable cause. That requirement has given way
to acceptance of a mere generalized suspicion, permitting seizures even where
127
no exigency is alleged.
One of the most recent cases demonstrating this erosion is California v.
Hodari.128 In this case two officers on routine patrol, and in an unmarked
vehicle, rounded a comer and observed several youths gathered around a car
parked at the curb. Seeing the officers approaching, the youths took flight. A
footchase ensued. As Officer Pertoso closed in, Hodari tossed away a small
object. Hodari was tackled, arrested and found to be in possession of $130 and
a pager. The discarded object was found to be crack cocaine.
In the proceedings that followed, the prosecution conceded that the officers
had neither probable cause to arrest, nor a reasonable suspicion sufficient to
justify a stop under the tenets of Terry. The government argued, however, that
the defendant had not been "seized" or "stopped" until he was tackled. The
drugs should be admissible, then, since they were voluntarily discarded prior
to any police misconduct.
The defendant, relying upon the standard set forth by the Court in United
States v. Mendenhall,129 argued that he had been "seized" when he saw the officer
run towards him. 130 Hodari contended that the officer's footchase was a
sufficient "show of authority" to render reasonable his conslusion that he was
not "free to leave."
The Court rejected the defendant's arguments on the grounds that
Mendenhall merely stated a necessary, but not always a sufficient, condition for
seizure. According to the Court, a "show of authority" is not tantamount to a

126 Terry, 392 U.S. at 38 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
127 See Michigan Department of Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990) (upholding the
use of field sobriety checkpoints which detained all motorists, even though no evidence
existed to justify the particular stop); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656 (1989) (permitting the suspicionless testing of employees for drugs); United
States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985) (permitting seizures based upon a reasonable
suspicion that the individual had committed a crime in the past); Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) (holding that the suspicion-less
questioning of factory workers by INS agents after posting armed agents at the exits
was not "search" and therefore lawful); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976) (relaxing the Terry standard for border search cases); and Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143 (1972) (permitting a seizure based upon an informant's uncorrobora ted tip).
128111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991).
129446 U.S. 544 (1980).
130
1d. at 554. The Mendenhall test stated: "A person has been 'seized' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding
the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." Id.
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seizure, and until an actual seizure occurs, there can be no Fourth Amendment
infraction.
Justices Stevens and Brennan fervently disagreed. These Justices found
appalling the majority's definition of "seizure," noting its stark contrast to
precedent. Justice Stevens wrote:
In particular, the Court now adopts a definition of 'seizure' that is
unfaithful to a long line of Fourth Amendment cases. Even if the Court
were defining seizure for the first time, which it is not, the definition
that it chooses today is profoundly unwise. In its decision, the Court
assumes, without acknowledging, that a police officer may now fire
his weapon at an innocent citizen and not13 1implicate the Fourth
Amendment-as long as he misses his target.
It would be difficult indeed for any reasonable person to conclude that
Hodari was "free to leave" under these circumstances. This conclusion being
inescapable, the Court had to abandon any standard which would focus on the
officer's illegal conduct. Thus, the majority created, seemingly out of thin air
and certainly in contradiction' to prior holdings, a tortured distinction between
seizures accomplished by an actual touching, and those effected by a show of
force. 13 2 Because of this, police will be encouraged to engage in illegal, (but
sufficiently slow) chases of citizens in the hope of obtaining contraband.
Officers may now gain by intimidation what they could not gain by adhering
to the law. The majority has concluded that an officer's "attempt to make an
unconstitutional seizure is beyond the coverage of the Fourth Amendment, no
matter how outrageous or unreasonable the officer's conduct may be."133 In
the process, the exclusionary rule has been severely compromised. The officer
may break the law with impunity, as long as he is not immediately
successful. 134

131California v. Hodari, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 1552 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132

The rigid definition of "seizure" adopted by the Court contradicts long-accepted
rules of construction. "The Fourth Amendment safeguards against all evils that are like
and equivalent to those embraced within the ordinary meaning of its words." Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,488 (1928) (Butler, J., dissenting). This view was embraced
by the majority in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,353 (1967).
133Hodari, 111 S.Ct. at 1561 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134
In Hodari, California admitted that the officers had no lawful cause to chase the
defendant. By upholding the admissibility of the drugs seized asa result of that unlawful
pursuit, the Court has eliminated the means created to deter such conduct. The dissent
argued forcefully that the exclusionary rule was meant to deter all police misconduct,
including attempted misconduct that results in the seizure of evidence. Justice Stevens
impassioned:
A search must be justified on the basis of facts available at the time
it is initiated; the subsequent discovery of evidence does not retroactively validate an unconstitutional search. The same approach
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The truth of this case is revealed, however, in a footnote to Justice Scalia's
majority opinion. 135 In this footnote, Justice Scalia implies his own belief that
the officers did possess the requisite level of proof to justify at least a temporary
seizure. Rather than grounding the decision in an explication of the "reasonable
suspicion" standard, 136 however, the Court chose to expound upon the legal
engaging in what Justice Stevens calls
definition of "seizure",
"logic-chopping." 137
While the Court's resort to tortured semantics in this case is notable, what is
more troubling is its contrast to Terry (although there has been a continuing
erosion of the tenets of that case). In Hodari, there is no assertion from any
quarter that the officers feared for their safety at any time. Nor was there the
slightest hint that a violent crime was about to occur. Indeed, no exigency is
even mentioned. The Court obviously found these contrasts unremarkable,
indicating just how diluted the original Terry standard has become. Terry has
metamorphosed from requiring a particularized suspicion in exigent

should apply to seizures; the character of the citizen's response
should not govern the constitutionality of the officer's conduct.
California v. Hodari, 111 S. Ct. 1547,1560 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
135Justice Scalia noted:
California conceded below that Officer Pertoso did not have
the 'reasonable suspicion' required to justify stopping Hodari ...
That it would be unreasonable to stop, for brief inquiry, young
men who scatter in panic upon the mere sighting of the police is
not self-evident, and arguably contradicts proverbial common
sense. See Proverbs 28:1 ("The wicked flee when no man pursueth".)
We do not decide that point here, but rely entirely upon the State's
concession.

Hodari, 111 S. Ct. at 1549 n.1.
In a war of footnotes, Justice Stevens responded:
The Court's gratuitous quotation from Proverbs 28:1 ... mistakenly
assumes that innocent residents have no reason to fear the sudden
approach of strangers... It has long been "a matter of common
knowledge that men who are entirely innocent do sometimes fly from
the scene of a crime through fear of being apprehended as the guilty
parties, or from an unwillingness to appear as witnesses. Nor is it true
as an accepted axiom of criminal law that 'the wicked flee when no
man pursueth, but the righteous are as bold as a lion'."
Id. at 1553 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
13 6 There is precedent for the Court to find lawful police conduct which the
government concedes is unlawful. In Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291,296 (1973), the state
admitted that the officers did not have probable cause to detain and search the
defendant. They sought to justify the search on an exigent circumstances rationale.
While the Court agreed that the exigency (the destruction of evidence) justified the
search, it found as an additional basis for its decision the belief that the officers did
indeed have probable cause to arrest Mr. Murphy. Thus, the search could have been
justified as incident to arrest. TheHodariCourt was not strictly bound, then, by the state's
concession that the officers had acted unlawfully.
13 7 HOdari, 111 S. Ct. at 1561 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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circumstances, to requiring a mere generalized suspicion even in the absence
of any exigency.
Have we reached the bottom of this "slippery slope"? The Court has openly
indicated that "reasonable suspicion" is not the Constitutional floor.138 It has
demonstrated this by giving approbation to stops of scores of innocent
motorists when police have no suspicion at all vis-a-vis the individual
driver. 139 In upholding wholesale stops of citizenry at checkpoints designed to
test for persons driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol, the Court has
simply ignored the Constitution in order to aid law enforcement. In a "lose-lose"
kind of logic, the Court has found such intrusions justified, at least in part, by
the lack of an individualized suspicion-that such intrusions are
140
constitutionally acceptable precisely because they are conducted en masse.
Other cases demonstrate that Hodari is no anomaly. In United States v.

Sokolow,

14 1

the Court upheld the stop of a traveler because he fit the profile of

a drug dealer. No illegal behavior was observed. 142 Nor were there any
138 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976). See also Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S 602, 624 (1989).
139 See Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
140As one commentator stated: "It is rather peculiar, however, that random
detentions of only a few violate the Fourth Amendment, but that such violations
disappear as long as everyone is subjected to the same stop." Jill W. Broderick, Casenote,
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz: Suspicionless Seizures and the Fourth
Amendment, 11 N. ILL. L. REV. 349, 370 (1991). Further reference is made to this novel
reasoning by Justice Rehnquist:
Because motorists, apparently like sheep, are much less likely to be
"frightened" or "annoyed" when stopped en masse, a highway patrolman needs neither probable cause nor articulable suspicion to stop all
motorists on a particular thoroughfare, but he cannot without articulable
suspicion stop less than all motorists. The Court thus elevates the adage
"misery loves company" to a novel role in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The rule becomes "curiouser and curiouser" as one attempts to
follow the Court's explanation for it.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 664 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
141490 U.S. 1 (1989).
14 2

The following facts gave rise to the agents' "reasonable suspicion": Sokolow paid
cash for his ticket; he was traveling to and from Miami; he was staying in Miami for
only forty-eighthours; he did not check any luggage; he was dressed in a black jumpsuit;
he wore gold jewelry; he appeared nervous; his name did not match the name under
which the phone number he provided was listed. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,
3-4 (1989).
Justice Marshall, however, noted that a drug courier profile has a "chameleon-like
way of adapting to any particular set of observations" and listed a host of cases
describing characteristics found by the Court to be suspicious: first to deplane; last to
deplane; deplaned in the middle; purchased one-way ticket; purchased round-trip
ticket; changed planes; non-stop flight; no luggage; gym bag; new suitcases; traveling
alone; traveling with companion; acted nervously; acted too calmly. He argued persua-
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indication that a violent crime was about to occur, or that the agents might be
in danger. In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,143 the Court upheld the
warrantless sixteen-hour incommunicado detention of an airline passenger
suspected of smuggling drugs in her alimentary canal. (Agents told her she
would remain until she consented to an x-ray or defecated in a bucket.)144 The
Court found this conduct reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and
blamed the length, discomfort, and humiliating nature of the detention on the
defendant's action (her method of drug smuggling).145 Addressing the Court's
failure to apply the warrant clause, Justice Brennan stated: "Something has
gone fundamentally awry in our constitutional jurisprudence when a neutral
and detached magistrate's authorization is required before the authorities may
inspect the plumbing... in a person's home, but not before they may hold him
in indefinite involuntary isolation. .. ."146 Further addressing the Court's

distortion of Terry, he continued: "It is simply staggering that the Court
suggests that Terry would even begin to sanction [such a detention], even one
14 7
occurring at the border."
D. Searches
In 1969, the Supreme Court held in Chirnel v. California,148 that officers
lawfully arresting an individual could search, incident to that arrest, the
arrestee's person, and the area within his reach or control. The search of this
area was permitted without a warrant, in the interests of protecting the officers
and preserving evidence.
Chimel had been lawfully arrested within his home. Contemporaneous with
his arrest, however, officers had conducted a warrantless search of his entire
house. This, the Court ruled, violated the Fourth Amendment's proscription
against unreasonable searches and seizures. "If you want to search the house,"

sively that such profiles may be adapted to fit large numbers of presumably innocent
travelers. Id. at 13-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
143473 U.S. 531 (1985).
144

1d. at 532-36.

145

Id. at 544.

46

1 1d. at 555-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (referring to the Camara Court's conclusion
that a warrant was needed for administrative inspections) (emphasis in original).
14 7
d. at 559 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Terry authorized "temporary" stops, not
sixteen-hour detentions.
148395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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the Court opined, "get a search warrant."149 The presumptive need for a
warrant was reaffirmed. 150
In Maryland v. Buie,151 however, the Court retreated from this position. In
this case, police obtained arrest warrants for two men wanted in an armed
robbery of a pizza parlor. Executing a warrant two days after the robbery,
officers entered Buie's house. At the top of the basement stairs, an officer
shouted for anyone in the cellar to come out. Buie did so and was arrested
without incident. In what the officers characterized as a "protective sweep," the
basement was then searched for other people. In the course of that search,
clothing matching the description of that worn by one of the robbers was
152
seized.
Buie's subsequent conviction, based in part on the incriminating clothing,
was reversed by the Court of Appeals of Maryland.153 That Court held that a
warrantless search may only be justified as a "protective sweep" when there is
probable cause to believe that an articulable and demonstrable potential for
danger exists. None was shown here. The Supreme Court of the United States
reinstated the conviction, holding that the protective sweep was justified
because the arrest occurred on "the adversary's turf' where "an ambush in a
confined setting of unknown configuration is more to be feared ....154 The
Court balanced the need to search against the invasion of privacy suffered
149 Judges and scholars have long debated whether the Fourth Amendment forbids
warrantless searches, or merely unreasonable searches. Its phrasing (the use of the word
"and" between the privacy clause and the warrant clause) begets confusion. One scholar
has isolated three possible interpretations:
1) that the "reasonable" search is one which meets the warrant requirements specified in the second clause; 2) that the first clause provides
additional restriction by implying that some searches may be "unreasonable" and therefore not permissible, even when made under a warrant;
or 3) that the first clause provides an additional search power, authorizing the judiciary to find some searches "reasonable" even when
carried out without a warrant.
See JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND TEE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY N
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1966) (emphasis in original) He concludes, after
historical examination, that "either of the first two interpretations is faithful to the
intended meaning of the amendment (although the second is preferable)". He further
notes that "It would be strange, to say the least, for the amendment to specify stringent
warrant requirements, after having in effect negated these by authorizing judicially
unsupervised 'reasonable' searches without a warrant. To detach the first clause from
the second is to run the risk of making the second virtually useless." Id. at 42-44.
150For cases supporting the presumptive need for a search warrant, see, Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
151494 U.S. 325 (1990).
152

1d. at 328.

53

1 1d. at 329.
154

d. at 333.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss1/5

28

19931

THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

thereby in favor of the state. The Court distinguished the instant case from
Chimel:
The type of search we authorize today is far removed from the "top to
bottom" search involved in Chimel; moreover it is decidedly not
"automati[c]," but may be conducted only when justified by a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the house
155 is harboring a person
posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.
Once again, however, the Court's logic is strained. The officers provided no
"reasonable, articulable suspicion" that anyone else was present in the house.
The sweep was conducted as a matter of course. The officers gained no new
information indicating danger to them after entering the house beyond what
they possessed before their arrival. That being the case, there is simply no legal
justification for excusing the requirement of a search warrant. If the arrest in
his house, of an individual suspected of a violent crime, in and of itself creates
an exigency justifying a protective search, then officers who have taken the time
to secure an arrest warrant, and who have substantial control over the time and
place of arrest, can certainly be asked to comply with the Fourth Amendment's
search warrant requirement. Surely this conclusion works no onerous burden
on law enforcement. Absent some real, rather than speculative potential for
danger, such searches clearly violate the Fourth Amendment.
In Florida v. Bostick,156 the High Court addressed the Broward County
Sheriff's Department's drug interdiction practice of "working the buses." Two
uniformed officers (at least one bearing a firearm) boarded a bus traveling from
Miami to Atlanta during a stopover in Fort Lauderdale and chose Terry Bostick
for questioning. The officers acknowledged that they had no articulable
suspicion regarding Bostick, or any of the passengers. Bostick agreed to allow
the officers to inspect his ticket and identification, both of which were
unremarkable. The officers persisted, requesting permission to inspect his
luggage. The defendant insisted that he refused; the officers testified that he
consented. 157 The ensuing search revealed a quantity of cocaine. Bostick
appealed his conviction to the Florida Supreme Court.
The Florida Supreme Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment permits
police officers to approach citizens randomly, without an articulable suspicion
of wrongdoing, in airports and other public places, to question them and ask
their consent to search parcels and luggage, as long as a reasonable person
would understand that he or she can refuse to cooperate. 158 The Florida
155d at 336.
156111 S.Ct. 2382 (1991).
157Bostick insisted 1)that he did not consent to the search, and 2) that he was not told
that he had a right to refuse to consent to such a search. The police, of course, disagreed,
and the trial court ruled in their favor. Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1154-55 (Fla.

1989).
158

The approach of a police officer is a fearful thing. Officers do not approach citizens
to ask the time of day or to chat about the weather. Citizens may rightfully assume that
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1993
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Supreme Court distinguished the above situations from those occurring on a
bus. For the Florida court, the bus setting provided a necessarily cramped and
confined setting. Police loom over seated passengers creating such an
intimidating atmosphere that people cannot reasonably feel free to leave (or to
refuse cooperation). For this reason, the court held that police-citizen
encounters which would be permissible in most public places are not
permissible on a bus. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, avowedly to
examine this per se rule, rather than to rule on the specific findings of the case
at hand.
In overturning the Florida court's decision, Justice O'Connor wrote that
there was insufficient reason to distinguish between public places and a bus
for Fourth Amendment purposes. The issue should not have been the physical
site of the encounter, or whether the defendant felt "free to leave." 159 Rather,
the question should have been whether a reasonable person would have felt
free to refuse the police request or otherwise terminate the encounter. This
question should have been answered by examining the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the incident. The physical site of the encounter was
but one of those factors. The majority remanded the case to the Florida Supreme
Court for a re-evaluation under the appropriate standard. 160
Dissenting, Justices Marshall, Stevens and Brennan would have found the
suspicionless, warrantless sweep of buses unconstitutional as coercive and
unjustified invasions of privacy. While agreeing in concept with the test
articulated by the majority, the Justices easily concluded that the search
conducted here failed that test on its face. No reasonable person seated on a
bus, waiting for it to depart, confronted by two standing, uniformed police
officers, one armed, blocking egress from the seat, and "requesting" permission
to search one's bags, would feel that they had a right to refuse. 161
The dissenting Justices had no difficulty distinguishing a bus from other
public settings. In bus or airport terminals, citizens move about more freely to
evade or terminate unwanted encounters with the police. Bus seats provide

the approach of an officer signals an investigation of criminal activity. Even for the
innocent, the "mere encounter" the Court sanctions is not without its intimidating effects.
In addition, most citizens do not know that they have the right to walk away, and officers
are under no obligation to so inform them.
159 Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2386 (1991). She pointed out that once on a bus,
passengers might be constrained from leaving for reasons other than police
presence-such as missing their departure.
160
Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2388.
16
1Bostick's argument before the trial court, while not successful, was credible: What

'reasonable person', having been approached by uniformed officers who have identified
themselves as narcotics investigators, having been advised that he could refuse their
request to search his bag, knowing that there was a quantity of cocaine there, would
voluntarily consent to such a search? Id. Logic would lead to the conclusion that either
1)he was intimidated into consenting to the search, or 2)he was so incompetent that he
could not have lawfully provided a knowing and voluntary consent.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss1/5
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very little freedom or opportunity to move. According to the dissent, by
permitting such searches, the majority effectively declared buses a zone devoid
of constitutional protections.
The dissent also pointed out how far out of touch the majority had become
with the reality of life in America. Bostick, once confronted, had two choices:
refuse to comply or leave the bus. Both avenues created risks that, in essence,
nullified his freedom of choice. By refusing to cooperate, he risked arousing the
anger and further suspicions of the officers, who would then intensify the
interrogation. This response to a suspect's refusal to comply is commonly
known and accepted. The fact that police are not lawfully permitted to hold
such refusal against a passenger is not a fact citizens can be expected to know.
Bostick's alternative was to leave the bus, squeezing by the very officers he was
seeking to avoid, and risking the loss of his bus ride and becoming stranded in
a strange town. 162 Justice Marshall complained: "The spectre of American
citizens being asked, by badge-wielding police, for identification, travel
papers-in short a raison d'etre-is foreign to any fair reading of the
Constitution, and its guarantee of human liberties." 163
Quoting an ominous passage from a Federal District Court, Marshall
concluded: "It seems rather incongruous at this point in the world's history
that we find totalitarian states becoming more like our free society while we in
this nation are taking on their former trappings of suppressed liberties and
freedoms."164 Travelers, according to the Court, should no longer be surprised
by uniformed officers "requesting" identification, travel documents, and
"permission" to search personal belongings. 165
V. ANALYSIS-HYDRAULIC FORCES AT WORK
In 1968, Justice Douglas warned of "powerful hydraulic pressures. .. that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give

1621d.

at 2393 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

163 1d.

at 2391 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Kerwick, 512 So. 2d 347, 348

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1987)).
164United States v. Lewis, 728 F. Supp. 784, 788 (D.D.C. 1990), rev'd, 921 F. 2d 1294
(D.C. Cir. 1990).
165

[Iln Broward County, Florida, these police officers approach every
person on board buses and trains ("that time permits") and check
identification, tickets, ask to search luggage-all in the name of
"voluntary cooperation" with law enforcement-to the shocking
extent that just one officer, Damiano, admitted that during the
previous nine months, he himself, had searched in excess of three
thousand bags! In the Court's opinion, the founders of the Republic
would be thunderstruck.
Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153,1158 (quoting State v. Kerwick, 512 So. 2d 347, 348-49
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. (1987)).
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the police the upper hand. 166 Those hydraulic forces have taken on some new
guises, but they are readily apparent.
A. The New Conservatives
The past decade has seen the appointment of a large number of federal
judges by conservative Presidents. 167 These appointments are central to the
conservative shift occurring in constitutional jurisprudence.168
Many of these conservatives embrace the philosophy of judicial restraint.

Simply put, the "restraintists" believe that the Court should be limited in its
power and authority, and bound by the literal wording of the Constitution, and
when that fails, to the debates leading to the adoption of the particular clause
in question (although pure restraintists would likely take issue with that
resort). These advocates believe that this conservative ideology will not only
stay the judicial indulgences of the 1960s, but that it effectively eliminates the
uncertainty inherent in constitutional interpretation. Moreover, judicial
restraint reflects allegiance to the federalist principles upon which the country
169
was founded.
This philosophy is seductive. It appears, first of all, to be self-effacing. The
Court, under this doctrine, enables the will of the people (as determined by
their elected representatives) to be implemented by according great deference
to state statutes and regulations. The Court "restrains" itself, magnanimously,
from invalidating rules established by the majority, even if it disagrees with
170
them.

166 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
167 During his eight year term, PresidentReagan appointed more than half of all lower
court judges (372 out of 736), three Supreme Court Justices, and elevated Rehnquist to
the position of Chief Justice. "No other President has had as great an impact on the
federal judiciary since Roosevelt . . . Through judicial appointment . . . the
administration 'institutionalize(d) the Reagan revolution so it can't be set aside no
matter what happens in future presidential elections'." DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM
CENTER. THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 100-102 (2d ed. 1990).
168
President Reagan, in each of his campaigns, promised to appoint only those judges
who opposed abortion and the judicial activism of the Warren and Burger Courts. See
O'Brien, supra note 167, at 100; see also HERMAN SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS: THE

CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO REWRITE THE CONSTITUTION (1988).

The use of the presidential power to appoint life-tenured judges as a political tool
is not new. Regarding this practice, Chief Justice Rehnquist said, "There is no reason in
the world why a President should not do this." He further characterized such political
moves as 'both normal and desirable". See DAVID GELFAND ET AL., 8 MEN AND A LADY:
PROFILES OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT (Bethesda: National Press 1990)
16 9 SeegenerallyROBERTH. BORK, THE TEMPTING OFAMERICA: THEPOLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAw (1990).
17 0
Note Justice O'Connor's disclaimer: "[Tihis Court is not empowered to forbid law
enforcement practices simply because it considers them distasteful." Florida v. Bostick,
111 S.Ct. 2382,2389 (1991).
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Second, this theory of jurisprudence reinforces the Court's standing as a
neutral, detached 171 and objective body. The Court avoids the temptation of
becoming legislators, retains a legitimacy as the supreme arbiter of law, and
maintains a Solomon-like image of wisdom and forbearance.
Third, judicial restraint is a safe ideology. It provides structure, discipline
and predictability to constitutional analysis. Logically, this would result in an
elevation of the doctrine of stare decisis, and lend credibility, authority and
stability to the Court.1 72
Fourth, the exercise of judicial restraint is said to minimize the all too human
173
tendency to allow one's own predilections to color the outcome of the case.
Fifth, the doctrine permits judges to honorably sidestep difficult
constitutional issues by asserting a lack of authority. To the textualists, 174 if the
Constitution does not address the issue directly, its resolution is left to the
people, not to the courts. 175
As alluring as this philosophy may be, there are persuasive arguments from
the "nontextualists."176 While recognizing the validity of the democratic,
majoritarian system, these proponents also value the unique and essential role
of the Court in setting boundaries beyond which even the majority may not
tread. The purpose of a Bill of Rights is to protect the minority from the tyranny
of the majority.

17 1

For instance, the overturning of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) has been
advocated not only because the "right to abortion" does not appear literally in the
Constitution, but also because the issue is a "political" one, and the Court must detach
itself from political issues.
172This article points out several departures from prior case law taken by the Court
in thepast few years. It cannot be safely said that the new conservative jurists will adhere
to precedent as a general rule. See supra text accompanying note 5.
173Justice Scalia has lauded the doctrine of "original intent" as restraining judicial
activism. It "establishes a historical criterion that is conceptually quite separate from the
preferences of the judge himself." Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN.
L. REV. 849, 864 (1989).
174
1t is not axiomatic that one who advocates judicial restraint is also a textualist. For
the purposes of this article, however, I will take the liberty of placing restraintists and
textualists together as components of the conservative camp. For a comprehensive
treatment of these philosophies, see SCHWARTZ, supra note 6.
175Justice Black epitomizes this concept. When the majority struck down the
Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives, he dissented. "The Court talks
about a constitutional 'right of privacy' as though there is some constitutional provision
or provisions forbidding any law ever to be passed which might abridge the 'privacy'
of individuals. But there is not." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,508 (1965) (Black,
J., dissenting). He continues: 'I like my privacy as well as the next one, but I am
nevertheless compelled to admit that government has a right to invade it unless
prohibited by some specific constitutional provision." Id. at 510 (Black, J., dissenting).
176Professor Schwartz claims that the jurisprudence of original intent is "both
undesirable and unworkable. It would turn back the constitutional clock two centuries
and fossilize our public law." See SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, at 7.
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Second, the nontextualists believe that the role of the Court is integral to a
free society, and necessary to balance the sometimes overzealous or misguided
actions of government against those fundamental rights accorded by the
Constitution. As Justice Douglas said, "Power is a heady thing...."177
Third, they hold that the Constitution should not be limited to a literal
interpretation. 1 78 In the nontextualist's view, the Constitution was designed to
live, breathe, and evolve as society matures. 179 The fact that this makes
constitutional jurisprudence more difficult is no reason to abdicate the Court's
responsibility to adapt the document to the modem world.
Fourth, (in reply, more specifically, to the textualists), it is not only unwise,
but impossible to ascertain the "original intent" of the framers. Incomplete and
unclear historical records preclude an accurate determination of the exact
meaning of the Constitution's authors. 180

For the restraintists, however, recognition of a constitutionally-based, albeit
unenumerated, right to privacy opens a pandora's box. It invites judicial

1 77

McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).

178

Professor Schwartz delineates several unenumerated rights which have long been
accepted as an integral part of our system of criminal justice: the right to be presumed
innocent, the right to proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right to attend
criminal trials. Other intrinsic rights include the right to vote, to travel, to compete for
public office and to engage in political activities. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, at 62-67. The
Court has created additional rights (founded in those specifically enumerated), most
notably: the right to be told your rights before custodial interrogation, Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); and the right to have illegally obtained evidence excluded
in a criminal trial, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
179

Two centuries ago Thomas Jefferson expounded this philosophy. In a 1789 letter
to James Madison, he addresses "whether one generation of men has a right to bind
another". He asserted, "[e]very constitution, then, every law naturally expires at the end
of thirty-four years. If it be enforced longer, it is an act of force, and not of right.., the
earth belongs in usufruct to the living.., the dead have neither powers nor rights over
it." II THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 103-107 (1854).
More recently, Professor Schwartz declares, "The Constitution ... from its nature
... deals in generals, not details. The Constitution states, not rules for the passing hour,
but principles for an ever-expanding future." SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, at 10 (referencing
Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 61,87 (1809) and BENJAMIN N.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 83 (1921)).
Professor Amsterdam insists, "[g]rowth is what statesmen expect of a
Constitution." Amsterdam, supra note 75, at 399.
180 Professor Schwartz explains that we have a "strikingly incomplete" historical
record of the Philadelphia Convention of 1787. "Madison's notes, the fullest account we
do have.. . are at best a sketchy transcript... Then, too, there is the question of whose
intent is to govem." He notes that it is difficult to determine who qualifies as a "framer"
and of those who do, whose statements should be accorded more weight? SCHWARTZ,
supra note 6, at 9.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss1/5

34

19931

THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

1 81
expansionism precisely because it is imprecise. Since the Constitution does
not provide specifics for such a protection, jurists must brave uncharted, and
often frightening territory. It is much easier just to deny its existence.
Yet these restraintists are anything but restrained. The Court has assumed
for itself broad areas of discretion in Fourth Amendment cases by adopting
vague and malleable standards of interpretation which readily accommodate
any conclusion it might care to reach. 182 By relying upon such amorphous
terms and phrases as "totality of the circumstances," "weighing the
government's interest against the individual's interest in privacy," and
"reasonable" (as in the "reasonable person standard" or "what society accepts
as objectively reasonable" or even "reasonable suspicion"), the Court allows
itself extraordinary latitude to indulge personal preferences and predilections
183
under the guise of sound constitutional principles. The imprecision of such
lofty terms permits the very judicial indulgences that the restraintists claim to
oppose. This metamorphic jurisprudence has allowed the Justices so inclined
to tip the scales in favor of further governmental intrusions rather than
individual privacy rights. The conservative agenda is well-served by this
constitutional strategy. The Court can uphold wholesale constitutional
intrusions into citizens' private lives, be it from aerial surveillance, trash
searches, or suspicionless stops, and still claim allegiance to the Constitution.
But why is the Court so willing to do so?

B. Drug Wars
A declaration of war is usually accompanied by the suspension of accepted
restrictions on law enforcement officers and by the imposition of martial law.
In the view of some legal scholars, the "war on drugs" of the past several years
has resulted in just such an erosion (if not a suspension) of judicial regard for

181Justice Black attacked the notion of a constitutional right of privacy in a
memorandum. In it he assailed the Court's reliance upon an unenumerated right and
predicted "the freedom constitutionally promised (will become) a debased alloy transmuted into a freedom which will vacillate and grow weaker or stronger as the
Court personnel is shifted from time to time". BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED
OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT 274 (1985).
182

"[Tlhe 'unreasonableness' standard is obviously much too amorphous either to
guide or regulate the police. Lurking beneath the difficulty, in turn, is the monstrous
abyss of a graduated Fourth Amendment... splendid in its flexibility, awful in its
unintelligibility, unadministrability, unenforcibility and general ooziness." Amsterdam,
supra note 75, at 414-15.
183 According to Justice Marshall, abuse of the "reasonableness balancing test" has
rendered the Fourth Amendment "virtually devoid of meaning, subject to whatever
content shifting judicial majorities,.., choose to give to that supple term." Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 637 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In
the same opinion, he refers to the test as "formless and unguided" and "Rohrschach-like".
Id. at 639.
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eliminated,
unenumerated and indistinct,
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188 The folly of such a course, however, was observed
may seem acceptable.
liberty ... has largely been the
years ago: "[Tlhe history of the destruction of
the face of plausible-sounding
history of the relaxation of those safeguards in
with widely frightening and
governmental claims of a need to deal
9
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190 which may call for special rules in Fourth
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(1989)
656,681
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489
Raab,
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dissenting); National Treasury Employees Union v. of privacy and human dignity in
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("ITIhe [drug testing] rules are a kind
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symbolic opposition to drug use.") (Scalia, J., dissenting);
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U.S. 1, 17 (1989) ("[Wjhen drug crimes
dissenting).
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give[s] short shrift to constitutional rights.") (Marshall
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however, seems to be finding
Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2389 (1989). The Court,
fewer and fewer "rights" to be respected.
police intrusions into homes to
l88Freund notes "society's acceptance of 'dog sniffs,' standards supplied by the 'drug
prevent the destruction of narcotics, and even the vague supra note 70, at 217 (citations
courier profile"' as a result of the fear of drugs. Freund,
omitted).
189Amsterdam, supra note 75, at 354.
190 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
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outweigh that of the individual to the extent that traditional constitutional
protections may be reduced. 191 Justice Marshall put it somewhat differently:
"IThe Court has now permitted 'special needs' to displace constitutional
text.' 192 Such diminution is, in the Court's view, "reasonable". These "special
needs" include, inter alia: the maintenance of order in schools, 193 the "efficient
and proper operation of the workplace, 194 the need to preserve "the deterrent
effect of the supervisory arrangement" of probation, 195 the need to detect
possible drug use of railroad employees to ensure safety,196 the need to deter
drug use among those seeking promotions to "sensitive" government
positions, 19 7 and the need to prevent drugs from entering the country.198 When
a special need is found (and drugs have been so deemed),1 99 the government
may dispense with the warrant requirement, the probable cause requirement,
the individualized suspicion requirement of Terry, and, now, the requirement
of even a generalized suspicion. Contrary to Justice Marshall's declaration that
there is no "drug exception to the Bill of Rights",200 the Court seems to have
found one.
The price of this "anything goes"2 01 war on drugs is the sacrifice of individual
liberties, most notably the privacy protection. 202 By construing the Fourth
Amendment to proscribe "unreasonable" searches (rather than warrantless
searches), the Court may, in its discretion, find "reasonable" even the most

19

11d.
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 636 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
193New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
192

194
195

0'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987).
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 878 (1987).

196

Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
1 National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
97

198

United States v. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985).

99

1 See supra note 186.
2 00"There

is no drug exception to the Constitution, any more than there is a

communism exception or an exception for other real or imagined sources of domestic
unrest." Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,641 (1989) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).

20lUnited States v. Lewis, 728 F. Supp. 784, 789 (D.D.C. 1990), rev'd, 921 F.2d 1294
(D.C. Cir. 1990).
202 professor
Wisotsky addresses other basic rights which have been sacrificed on the
battleground: the presumption of innocence, the right to non-excessive bail,
interference with the attorney-client relationship, the4?re-conviction confiscation of
property and the imposition of disproportionate sentences. Wisotsky, supra note 184, at

895-907.
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egregious invasions. 203 In striving for the eradication of drugs, near unlimited
power has been bestowed upon law enforcement. 204 However, as one jurist
noted, "[d]uties of law enforcement officials are extremely demanding in a free
society. But that is as it should be. A policeman's jobais easy only in a police
state."205
The erosion of Fourth Amendment protections has been gradual, steady, and
insidious. Fundamental rights to privacy have "recede(d) by gradual erosion,
by relentless nibbling, rather than gobbling. 206 The need to deal effectively
with drug abuse is not disputed here. In its eagerness to be of assistance,
however, the Court has abdicated its role as an independent arbiter and
defender of the Constitution. But, as even Justice Scalia has said, "the
impairment of individual liberties cannot be the means of making a point."20 7
Nor are the honorable intentions of the Court disputed. However, honorable
intentions do not a free society make. Justice Brandeis said it well:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom
are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment
208
by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.
C. The Presumptionof Guilt
Fourth Amendment issues stand in stark contrast to others raised under the
Bill of Rights. In most of these cases, uniquely, the factual guilt of the accused
203

Professor Wisotsky relates the resignation of a federal magistrate "in protest of the
continued erosion of the rights of those accused of crime". Wisotsky, supra note 184, at
923. Magistrate Nimkoff of the Southern District of Florida accused police of behaving
like criminals in the war on drugs and spoke of "classically authoritarian behaviors"
which jeopardize the presumption of innocence. Wisotsky, supra note 184, at 923-24
(citing Payne, Upset With Court Trends, Top-Rated Nimkoff To Quit, MIAMI NEWS, Jan. 4,
1986, § A, at 1.)
20 4See generally Wisotsky, supra note 184. Professor Wisotsky relates the extent to
which the executive branch of government and its attendant law enforcement agencies
(including, inter alia, NASA, CIA, FBI, IRS, DEA, DoJ., Dept. of the Treasury, NNBIS
(National Narcotics Border Interdiction System) and the military) have gone to wage
this war on drugs. He includes sections on the military, the collection of information on
hundreds of thousands of innocent citizens by a computerized index system known as
NADDIS (Narcotics and Dangerous Drug Information System), invasive monitoring of
personal behavior, the use of drug courier profiles to stop motorists, and the increasingly
widespread use of suspicionless stops at roadblocks.
205People v. Spinelli, 315 N.E.2d 792, 795, (N.Y. 1974); see also Foster, supra note 56, at
762.
20 6Wisotsky, supra note 184, at 923.
20 7National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 687 (1989) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
20 8
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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is indisputable. Unless the defendant denies knowledge of, or a possessory
interest in the questionably seized evidence, its very existence is dispositive.
While justice is blind in theory, its application is subject to the frailties inherent
in human judgment. It is understandable that a constitutional infraction of a
nebulous "right to privacy" will be overlooked when those injured by the
infraction are presumed guilty of what may be perceived as an even greater
harm.
But more is expected of members of the Court. They must, by necessity, rule
on issues which may "involv[e] not very nice people."209 The distaste they may
should not color the application of sound
have for the defendant's 2behavior
10
constitutional principles.
The temptation to engage in "post hoc rationalizations" 211 is one that must
be resisted if the Court is to remain true to its constitutional mandate. The
examination of possible Fourth Amendment violations must be made with the
firm notion that the accused was presumptively innocent. Too often, the Court
seems to slight this critically important element in its analysis. "[B]y such
extinguished, heedlessly at first, then
disregard ... the rights of liberty [are]
2 2
stealthily, and brazenly in the end." 1

Beyond the pitfalls of post hoc analyses, lies the question of whether the
Court has an accurate picture of the realities of the lives of ordinary citizens.
The Court has assumed the responsibility of faithfully assessing a "reasonable
man's" values and standards. Yet who is this "reasonable man"?
Justice Scalia asserted that the Court could most reliably ascertain society's
213 In
values by examining laws promulgated by its elected representatives.
Greenwood, however, the Court found the defendant's expectation of privacy
in his trash to be one that society was not willing to honor, despite the fact that
many municipalities have ordinances prohibiting anyone but authorized
haulers from rummaging through or interfering with trash placed out for
collection. Likewise, the Oliver Court found warrantless police entry onto
private and posted lands to be permissible, even when such conduct by
civilians would violate state trespass laws.
If legislation is not the gauge, should the Court look to the respected
segments of the media and news organizations? Apparently not. In Greenwood,

209United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
2 10"Trickle-down morality" is no more workable in constitutional jurisprudence than
"trickle-down economics" is in'the marketplace.
2 11

"[S]uch post hoc rationalizations have no place in our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, which demands that 'we prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluation
of the reasonableness of a search or seizure'." United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,
473 U.S. 531, 559 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v.
Martinez-Fuertz, 428 U.S. 543, 565 (1976)).
212
1d. at 567 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582,597
(1945) (Frankfurter, J.dissenting)).
213Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 865 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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once again, the dissent cited news articles expressing outrage at the invasion
by a tabloid reporter of (then) Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's trash. The
New York Times reported that Mr. Kissinger was "really revolted. 2 14 Other
journals characterized the event as "a disgusting invasion of personal
privacy,"215 "indefensible as... civilized behavior,"216 "and contrary to 'the way
decent people behave in relation to each other'." 2 17 If elected representatives
of the people are not "reasonable," and statesmen such as Henry Kissinger are
not "reasonable," and international news agencies are not "reasonable," what
barometer are the Justices using to make this determination?
There is credence to the complaints of those who claim that the Court has
lost touch with the everyday experiences that constitute life in this country.2 18
Justice Marshall illustrates this point in his Bostick dissent. After reviewing the
case, the majority found plausible the government's assertion that the
encounter between the police and the defendant was voluntary. According to
219
Justice Marshall, however, the facts belied this conclusion.
Citizens do not know that they may lawfully walk away from a police officer
wishing to speak with them. They have no idea whether the officer possesses
either a reasonable suspicion, or probable cause to authorize the interference,
and the officer has no obligation to tell them. In most cases, officers do not tell
citizens that they may refuse consent to search their personal belongings or
vehicles, and the citizen has no reason to know that he may lawfully decline
that consent.
A refusal to cooperate with the officer's "requests" only serves to elevate his
suspicions and invariably leads to an intensification of the encounter. 220 That
is a reality that all but the High Court seem to know. The notion that an officer,
having been denied consent to search a traveler's bags will politely tip his hat,
apologize for the inconvenience and walk away may be textbook, but it is not
reality.
Referring to the, police practice of suspicionless questioning of citizens,
Professor Amsterdam remarked: "Unless one takes a very middle-class white
2 14Califomia

v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,52 (1988) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (citing N.Y.

TIMEs, July 9, 1975, at Al).
2 5
1 1d. (citing Fleger, Investigative Trash, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, July 28, 1975, at

72).
216

1d. (citing WASHINGTON POST, July 10, 1975, at A18 (editorial)).

217

1d.

8

21 Justice Stevens chastised the majority for postulating an "ivory-towered analysis
of the real world for it fails to describe the experience of many...", California v. Hodari,
111 S. Ct. 1547,1553 n.4 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
219Florida v. Bostick, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2391 (1991) (Marshall, J., disseniing).
22
0"[R]espondent reasonably could have believed that [refusal to cooperate] would
only arouse the officers' suspicions and intensify their interrogation. Indeed, officers
who carry out bus sweeps like the one at issue here frequently admit that this is the
effect of a passenger's refusal to cooperate." Id. at 2393 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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view of life, here is a practice that cries out for some sort of fourth amendment
regulation."221 But even middle-class white America is not so naive.
D. Raminficationsfor the Law-Abiding Citizen
Denial of fundamental rights by the government, even to the factually guilty,
is unacceptable under our constitutional scheme. But what the Court does not
see are the intrusions by police which do not result in criminal prosecution. For
every Fourth Amendment case before the Court, there are thousands of
2
questionable invasions of privacy which go unexamined. m
Innocent people subjected to such intrusions, be they temporary

inconveniences or humiliating personal invasions, are unlikely to complain or

223
Nor are these
otherwise bring such conduct to the attention of authorities.
individuals likely to seek redress in the civil courts. Many cannot afford the
cost of a lawyer or the attendant fees of a civil suit. Many simply do not have

the time or the temerity to endure a lengthy civil process. For those who may
choose a civil rights action, the likelihood of success is low unless there are
willing eyewitnesses or the chance passerby with a video camera. The last

recourse of an aggrieved individual has traditionally been the Supreme Court.
The Court, however, seems to have abdicated this role, and has left individual
privacy in the sole discretion of officials.
Furthermore, some of these sanctioned searches are of such a nature that
citizens may not even be aware of the intrusion. It is not axiomatic that lack of

22 1

Amsterdam, supra note 75, at 405.

222

justice Marshall pointed out that in one case a single officer employing the
technique of sweeping the buses searched over three thousand bags in one nine-month
period; the percentage of drug finds was low. In another case a search of one hundred
buses netted seven arrests. Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2390 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (citing Florida v. Kerwick, 512 So. 2d 347,348-49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist.
1987) and United States v. Flowers, 912 F.2d 707, 710 (4th Cir. 1990)).
Justice Brennan noted that one physician, who had performed -many invasive
searches (rectal, vaginal, and stomach pumping) at thebehest of customs officials, found
illegal substances in only fifteen to twenty percent of those so examined. He further
noted that estimates show that contraband is found in only sixteen percent of women
subjected to body-cavity searches at theborder. United States v. Montoya deHemandez,
473 U.S. 531,557 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Thompson v. United States, 411
F.2d 946, 948 (9th Cir. 1969) and United States v. Holtz, 479 F.2d 89, 94 (9th Cir. 1973)).
In another case, at oral argument, government representatives refused to disclose
recent statistics regarding the number of innocent travelers subjected to x-ray searches,
because "it's not in the record and it's not public". United States v. Montoya de
Hemandez, 473 U.S. 531,557 n.26 (1985) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (citing Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 500, (1983)).
In yet another case, opposing mandatory drug-testing for promotion-seekers,
counsel for the union cited statistics that revealed that "no more than five employees
out of three thousand six hundred tested positive for drugs". National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,683-84 (1989).
223Of course, there is no reason to believe that satisfactory recourse would be found
by alerting law enforcement superiors.
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awareness means that no harm is done. The crux of Fourth Amendment is not
protection against incriminating evidence, it is protection of privacy interests.
Officers may enter onto private homesteads to search citizens' "open fields"
or
trash, or conduct aerial surveillance of their homes, and acquire information
which, while not criminally incriminating, might be embarrassing
or
compromising:
Police may look through windows and observe a thousand innocent
acts for every guilty act they spy out .... The question is not whether
you or I must draw the blinds before we commit a crime. It is whether
you and I must discipline ourselves to draw the blinds every time we
enter a room, under pain of surveillance if we do not. 22 4
Moreover, removing the constitutional constraints from those who may
abuse their privileged status as police officers is to invite increased intimidation
and alienation of the police from the citizenry. We are witnessing
an
ur'precedented revelation of police overreaching and the people
are
responding. Unfettered police power can only result in more crime, greater
unrest, and increased distrust of these public servants. Justice Clark's words
are as true today as they were in 1961:
Nothing can destroy a Government more quickly than its failure to
observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own
existence ....
If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself;
2 5
it invites anarchy. 2
VI. CONCLUSION

The aforementioned observations are, of course, but a small portion of the
realms which may be impacted by the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the
Constitution as it pertains to the right of privacy.226 Many of the Justices have

224

Amsterdam, supra note 75, at 403.
SMapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,659 (1961) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
22 6
Areas the Court may be called upon to consider include, inter alia: AIDS testing
of defendants accused of rape; AIDS testing of public and private health employees;
limits of state restriction to the right to terminate or refuse life support systems for the
the
terminally ill; the right of those not terminally ill to end their lives with professional
medical assistance; privacy of one's medical records and health insurance claims;
the
right of access by patients to their medical records; the distribution of consumer
information, data banks, dossiers and mailing lists; interception of cordless phone
conversations; privacy of library book or video rental records; privacy
of bank and
financial records; privacy of personnel files; privacy of computer communications.
Congress has addressed some of these issues through legislation. Fair Credit Reporting
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988) (protecting consumers from unauthorized disclosure
of
credit information); Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988) (barring certain sharing
of information among governmental agencies); Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 3401-22 (1988) (regulating governmental access to customer bank records); Video
22
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already expressed opinions which either question the existence of a right to
privacy in the Constitution, or which represent a very narrow view of that right.
The Fourth Amendment, the cornerstone of the privacy protection in the
criminal arena, has been compromised almost beyond recognition. By
disengaging the warrant clause from the privacy clause, the Court has rendered
the warrant requirement almost non-existent. 227 By permitting "special needs"
and personal predilections to dominate the determination of "reasonable", the
privacy clause has been rendered meaningless.
In addition, the Court has shown an extraordinary willingness to overturn
or dilute (either implicitly or explicitly) such touchstone cases as McDonald
(preference for a warrant), Katz (privacy as a personal rather than a property
right), and Terry (requiring articulable and individualized suspicion for
temporary stops). In so doing, they have strayed even further from the Fourth
Amendment's essence and purpose.
Under the new interpretations of the Amendment, citizens have lost privacy
rights on a grand scale. Police officers have been given unfettered discretion to
enter onto fenced and posted land in violation of state trespass laws; to conduct
aerial surveillance at low altitudes (and presumably take photographs) over
citizens' yards; to rummage through citizens' trash at will; to stop and oblige
citizens to produce identification, travel tickets, and agree to parcel searches;
to perform humiliating body searches at our borders; and to engage in a literal
pursuit of citizens as long as the officers do not catch them. Justice Marshall's
warning of an insidious and creeping "totalitarianism" is not the lament of a
bleeding heart liberal. It is the cry of a broken-hearted patriot.
The evisceration of the right of privacy comes not at the hands of an enemy,
but of those who are "well-meaning, but without understanding."22 8 The desire
to "get tough" in the war on drugs by empowering law enforcement, ignorance
of the thousands of abuses endured by private citizens at the hands of
unsupervised governmental agents, a detachment from the realities of the lives
of ordinary people, the distastefulness of preserving privacy when the
"unworthy" have asserted it, and a conservative ideology have all converged
to create this unprecedented assault on the right to privacy.

Privacy Protection Act of 1988,18 U.S.C. §2710 (1988) (generally prohibiting disclosures
of records of video rentals); Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 5
U.S.C. § 552a (1988) (regulating cross-matching of federally held information under
certain circumstances).
Many of these issues, however, will land in the lap of the Supreme Court. The
conservative shift of the Court provides some indication of how that body may
eventually decide these issues. The civil arena provides even further opportunities for
such invasions.
2 27
See LANDYNSKI, supra note 149, at 108-11 for a discussion of United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) and the Court's separation of the warrant clause from
the "unreasonable search and seizure" clause.
22 8
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1993

43

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:59

But "civilization is the progress toward a society of privacy. The savage's
whole existence is public, ruled by the laws of his tribe. Civilization is the
process of setting man free from men."22 9 If we expect our society to evolve,
then respect for individual rights, and individual privacy in particular, must
be given a high priority. Citizens have the right to be left alone; to carry on their
private and professional affairs free from governmental intrusion and
interference; to "breathe and not be stared at.' 230 Such rights are indispensable
to a free society.

229

See Foster, supra note 56, at 746 (quoting AYN RAND, THE FoUNTAINHEAD (1943)).

23 0

Amsterdam, supra note 75, at 401.
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